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Article 5

THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
We are about to look at society as it existed in Massachusetts from 1882 to 1902. We are about to look at the realities
of life in the older America. We are not going to the movies
but to fifty volumes of dusty sheep-bound law books. We are
going there because we want to see life in its reality. Americans have always known they could find real life in the
courts, as they have shown by flocking to court whenever the
event was advertised enough so they could know the time
and place. We are going to peep into fancy ways of committing and concealing murder, setting fires, defrauding creditors, avoiding taxes, selling liquor illegally and defrauding
people of their property. We shall be surprised to find people
suing continually and persistently over water and the right to
take it. It was then a source of motor power. We shall find
citizens and public bodies litigating to cut down every item
of public expense. We shall look at trade union wars. We
shall look at some wills which are more obscure and far more
fascinating than the latest crossword puzzle. We shall meet
some town and city fathers and look into things they did. We
shall meet ladies of high and low degree with a miscellaneous
line of claims. The most fascinating is one who makes no
pecuniary claims but boasts she will still sell liquor in spite
of all of the officers in Station 1. Incidentally we shall be getting a view of what law and its processes meant in the Golden
Age of American Law. It is a judicial world we are to look at
which means nothing more than an orderly arrangement of
society with some one to regulate matters in an established
manner, with that justice which a disinterested common man
can feel and understand. We shall in discussing it put both
"liberty" and "democracy" aside. These have recently become so indefinite they are hardly more than labels. Besides
we shall hardly hear of them in the age at which we are about
to look. The New England mind of that day was too real to be
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deceived by labels. We shall hear a great deal about law and
find much dependence on it. We shall find that law had many
quaint customs, some austerity, some humanity and a very
considerable authority in the older America. We shall discover sound reasons why it had that respect. We shall hear a
little about constitutions but the major emphasis will never
be there. Constitutions are something which are written
down on a paper. A person cannot write all that he is down
on a paper. A nation and a race cannot either. Papers can be
changed or amended but what flows in the blood of a race
cannot. The forms of law have flowed in the blood of AngloSaxons for a very long time. And their essence, since they
have one, can be stated in a'few words: the right to be heard,
the right to a decision, the right to an appeal on questions of
law, the right to have the question which was decided below
and none other discussed in the appellate court, the absolute equality of suitors and their counsel before every court.
Add men of good will to administer the system and what Mr.
Justice Fontescue called "a political government" 1 and you
have freedom. A people who are capable of preserving those
few things will always be free. They do not need to worry
about how the fashions in "liberty" and "democracy" change.
Tyrants and thieves, masquerading as reformers, liberals,
moralists or superior people generally, will always be seeking
to break through these essential things either by fraud or
influence. They would seize the machinery in order to use it
for their own purposes. If they succeed, even in respect to a
single one of these essentials, the citizen, his property and
his very life are in jeopardy. The age we are to look at here
understood this matter well. It was so much a part of the
being and the fibire of the people that we must look for and
find it in the background. It is like those things which are
never expressed because they are so well understood and are
taken as the common places of life and of existence.
1 Pomocx, THE GENrus oF THE CommoN LAw 58, (1912).
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We also are to meet a very quaint person, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who happened to be an Associate Justice and later
Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
during the period we are to examine. He is quaint in several
ways. He has smelled powder on a battle field. He can speak
of beer without any implication that it is a foreign substance.
He can write. He may be called one of the masters of literary
style but he tells us that no one can appreciate the resources
of the language who has not heard a mule driver search the
soul of a mule who refuses to move. He has a great white
mustache. He looks like an honorable man. We almost said
he looks like an aristocrat. But that word now needs redefinition. So we say he looks like a person who knows what he is
about. He has a medieval viewpoint in this: he is extremely
competent in his own business and expects others, even the
ordinary prudent person which the law takes as its standard,
even the merchant and the mechanic, to be competent in
theirs. And he proceeds to judge them and their affairs upon
that basis. The medieval world required a man to be an apprentice before he became a master. It was only then that he
became free. He rightfully is known as Justice Holmes. He
has a conscience and he always starts there. He frequently
writes that "it would be monstrous" la to hold thus and so. It
was he who said that a conclusion can always be put in a
logical 2 form. But he has something besides a conscience. He
has a mind. He has the finest reasoning capacity of any man
who ever sat on a bench. By reasoning capacity we mean
dealing with the actual facts before the court. The legal moralists have a separate world. Because of his medieval touch
he is a master craftsman in his knowledge of the law and its
background. I imagine he would not boast of that or even
speak of it. It was what he held himself out to do and therefore as a good medievalist he is bound to know it well. It was
not at all strange that this Yankee of the 1880's should have
la

Silva Wimpenny, 136 Mass. 253 (1884); Crocker v. Cotting, 170 Mass.

69, 48 N. E. 1023 (1898); Brauer v. Shaw, 168 Mass. 198, 46 N. E. 617 (1897).

2 HoLmEs, The Path of The Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167.
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something of the medieval. He was a lawyer. Pollock, who
explored the field of Anglo-Saxon law and absorbed its spirit
until he was the living symbol of it, summed up his work and
thought by referring to "Our Lady of The Common Law." I
Notre Dame was the symbol of the middle ages. It was
something which was bright and glorious and not something
brutal, dark and tricky. Because of his reasoning capacity we
will claim for Holmes the distinction of being the greatest
lawyer of the American scene. His conscience and his good
sense are his source of strength and his mind and knowledge
are trusted weapons which he has at hand for necessary occasions. When he meets with astute mentalities he does not
howl them down. He does not decide cases against them without giving reasons. He calmly reasons them down. He not
only reasons them down but overwhelms them. When he is
done there is not a shred left of either them or their argument. When he gets mad about these matters he gets intellectually mad and then God help the objects of his madness!
And it is an extremely hygienic social process. The police do
not need to shoot down malefactors in the street. They can
be safely brought to trial. Prosecutors need not indict men
who defraud society or the government of its due for lesser
crimes. It would be dangerous also for them to bring a man to
trial and depend on clamor or prejudice rather than law for a
conviction. Holmes' mind is on the alert and if necessary he
will look into the Year Books, the old tomes written in a
queer mixture of English, French and Latin where the decision of the early common law judges are recorded and explain
not only the rule but the reason for it. Such a capacity keeps
the law, not only in respect among honest citizens, but among
those who would be otherwise.
He is better defined by saying he is a competent rather
than a learned man. He has a mastery of a very diffuse body
of learning. But it is always a learning which he uses as a
skilled craftsman uses tools. There is more of the medieval
s

PoOxC, op. dt. supra, note 1.
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in this characteristic. His opinions refer to many old and
primitive forms. In the next sentence he is casting a searchlight on those forms and explaining their function. It is not
so with the many Latin phrases which he carries into his
writing. He seems to believe that they are a part of the common learning of the law and will be understood. He lived in
an age when Latin was still a part of the rudimentary education and before it had become a merely "cultural" subject.
But there is one Latin phrase which the lay public has lately
become much acquainted with which he seldom ever uses. It
is the phrase stare decisis. Translated literally the words
mean "to stand or proceed by the decisions". It has lately
come into the public mind to indicate that law is a dead science and its servants are perfectly helpless persons in a
changing world. Holmes was never a helpless person and the
English and American common law have never been helpless
for any marked period of time. There is little or no emphasis
on stare decisis in Holmes' work in Massachusetts. He does
speak at times of the inconvenience which would flow from
changing law which has been settled for a long timer.a No
rule which had its roots in the common law would be likely
to phase him. If it ever did, he at least did not yield up any
wail about it. And he has several characteristics which narrow the occasions on which he will be at cross purposes with
the rule stare decisis. The common law reaches back very far
in the experience of the English race. Like all those things
which are very old it has accumulated a wide experience with
human nature and its needs. In the course of that experience
it has been found necessary to forge many tools so that it has
a large collection of them, some of which have been put in
the legal woodshed because the momentary use for them is
passed. But they are still available for use if occasions require. Holmes' knowledge encompassed this arsenal of tools.
Then also he and his court were particularly careful with the
facts of the cases which they passed upon. He always pro3a

Cook v. Merrifield, 139 Mass. 139, 29 N. E. 540 (1885).

THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES

57

ceeds from the facts to the law. We have already said that
the grandeur of his reasoning rests in its being directed at the
facts before the court. This in itself eliminated the stare decisis rule in many cases and explains in part why Holmes
never has to place any great emphasis on the rule. He also
kept in mind another fine old Latin phrase of the common
law, obiter dictum. This means "said by the way". A court
in a written decision of necessity says a great many things.
For instance it generally has to state the claims made by
those against whom the decision is to be made and to distinguish them upon the facts and the law. Under the common
law and American law up until the past decade only the
point actually decided in a case was binding on the judges
under the stare decisis rule. We find Holmes stating in his
opinions, where he is following a previous case, that the point
was actually before the court and decided. 4 In this he is following the strict tradition of the Anglo-Saxon and early
American legal tradition. Thus the craftsman's knowledge of
all of his tools serves to the honor of his guild and never
leaves him a ridiculous person holding a tool which not only
will not work but which the holder blames for his inaction.
In a conference of lawyers held in the United States in the
summer of 1936 on the Common Law, Lord Wright called
the attention of the American bar to the limitations the Common Law rule of obiter dictum placed on stare decisis.5 He
quoted Lord Sumner that an obiter dictum was a "will o' the
wisp" and then went on to say that in it the full sense of responsibility had not been-felt by the judge who had made the
decision. In all of Holmes' work in Massachusetts this distinction not only is followed but emphasized by the written
word. It is an example of the adequacy of the law in dealing
with its own problems. The liberal, sociological, economic jurisprudence which came after Holmes, in its haste, swept these
fine distinctive old Latin phrases into the dust bin as "tech4
5

O'MaHey v. Twenty Five Associates, 178 Mass. 555, 60 N. E. 387 (1901).
THE FuTura or THE Com -ox LAw 66.
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nicalities" unworthy of the new enlightenment. It seized on
stare decisis of course as a horrible scarecrow and examined
it as if it was an ancient deadly weapon. The right of the
judge to legislate was openly declared. Now in the common
law judges could not legislate and if they ever did get close
to fhat line, far from boasting about it, they were bound to
deny it. Out of the new enlightenment and rising above the
temporary grave of "common law technicalities" came those
two popular illusions the "liberal" and the "conservative"
justice. The lineage of one is traced to Holmes, the other to
Marshall. One wonders if it is actually possible for the dead
to turn in their graves! It will be clear now why we have
given Holmes no greater praise than that he was a competent
man, like the craftsman of the middle ages, and a great lawyer.
It is already apparent that Holmes had a prodigious capacity for work. "Our ideal is repose perhaps because our
destiny is effort", 6 he writes. This was natural. He rose from
a society which felt it "had work to do and loads to lift." The
hobo who stopped for breakfast at least expected to split
some wood. Not that it was a world lacking in charity. It had
that and kindness too. We shall have some examples of its
charity and of Holmes' interpretation of charities under the
law. It was a world full of hope which went on the basis that
a man could win his place by honest work. Holmes wrote
over one thousand opinions for his court. There was no case
too small and none too great for his pen. And the written
work indicates on its face that it is but the summary of far
greater work in the preparation. This shines from every page
of his opinions. The opinions are never long. He states the
facts of the case and he reasons to them. He never uses the
butt of his pistol. He faces squarely into the facts and the
law. Each one of these jewels is a work of pain. Speaking of
7
the court he says that the work there has killed many men.
Like all works of art his opinions are self contained and
6 Memorial to Justice William Allen, 154 Mass. 607 (1891).
7 Memorial to Justice William C. Endicott, 177 Mass. 607, 612 (1901)
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peculiar to themselves. Here and there we shall be able to
extract a witty shaft from them which can stand by itself.
This compactness arises from the fact that he is never a
moralizer or posing. He reasons to the facts he is called upon
to try. In the old New England phrase he always minds his
own business.
In order to follow Holmes in administering the law it will
be helpful to see first what he understood by government and
what his idea of the state was. Government must be lawful
and not arbitrary. That is the character of a "political" government. There he follows Chief Justice Fontescue of the
fifteenth century Year Books. Since the political power is
exercised by the legislative branch its acts are entitled to
full faith and credit in the courts. In advising upon the right
of the Legislature to appropriate money to pay money to survivors of persons holding office at the time of death he said
the power existed if it was exercised in the public good and
not if the public advantage was a mere incident to the relief
of a private citizen. That distinction he said must be left to
the conscience of the Legislature.8 On an indictment for taking fines from an employee because of weaving defective
cloth in a mill he says the Legislature had a right to deprive
the employers of an honest tool if they were using it for a
dishonest purpose.' He cannot say the act is void as based
upon a false assumption since he knows nothing about the
matter one way or another. Thus he proceeds on the theory
that the Legislature acts in conscience and on information.
The same thought appears where he is passing on the acts
of municipalities, town meetings, school committees and
boards of health. Where the action is purely political he will
not interfere. If there is any abuse of the legal forms by
which political action expresses itself he immediately steps
in. He indicates the proper form, orders its observance, and
8
9

Opinion of The Justices, 175 Mass. 599, 57 N. E. 675 (1900).
Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 28 N. E. 1126 (1891).
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stops. He never moralizes about it. He is willing to go a long
ways to find any form of political action valid.9a If the action
of a city under its charter must be by a given board and
there was tacit assent of the board that will be enough.1" But
if a contract was required by law to be let to the lowest bidder and no bids were taken the court has a duty in the matter
because "the principal has given directions to insure being
dealt with honestly". 1 He regards the state as controlled by
law created and designed to give free play to political action.
The citizens have control of the state through law. It is a
government of laws because political action can only work in
that way. If there is free play of political action under law.
then the destiny of the state depends upon the conscience
and intelligence of those who make it up and whose control
of it the law preserves. When, therefore, he left a matter to
the conscience of the Legislature he was leaving it to the
conscience of the citizens who made up the state.
The citizen came in contact with the state not only by the
right to exercise the ballot but by the obligation to pay taxes.
And the New Englander was so conscious of that fact that
he kept his public officers sternly within bounds in spending
money. A highway surveyor before he was assigned to a district by the selectmen spent $47.88 for labor on the highways. The statute required the written consent of the selectmen on sums over $10.00. He was found to have spent $30.00
of the money judiciously; Holmes ruled he could not recover
any of the sum.' 2 When selectmen, in a moment of enthusiasm, offered a reward of $2500.00 for the arrest and conviction of the person who shot "Mr. Cunningham" and signed it
as "Selectmen of Melton" they were obliged to pay out of
their own pockets since they only had authority to bind the
town for $500.00.' s
9a

Staughton v. Paul, 173 Mass. 148, 53 N. E. 172 (1899).
Stratton v. Lowell, 181 Mass. 511, 63 N. E. 948 (1902).
11 Oliver v. Gale, 182 Mass. 39, 64 N. E. 415 (1902).
12 Goddard v. Inhabitants of Petersham, 136 Mass. 235 (1884).
13 Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28, 30 N. E. 85 (1892).
10

.
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The cost of keeping paupers fell by statute on the town of
which they were inhabitants. Towns were very keen in fastening the support of such persons on some other locality.
The statute of 1878 for the relief of veterans ran in the same
language used by the settlement act as to paupers. It was
repealed in 1879. The town of Granville went to law with the
town of Southampton regarding the settlement of a veteran
named Pomeroy and his wife and children. The former town
had supported them and sued to recover from the latter town
saying they belofged there. The defendant argued that the
relief statute did not apply to Pomeroy until 1879 and got
such a ruling from the trial court. It then sought to have the
same ruling applied to his family and being refused, on the
ground that the veterans' act had taken Pomeroy out of the
relief act but not his family, appealed to the Supreme Court
-upon that point and upon its obligation to support Pomeroy in any form whatever. This is one of the cases where
Holmes gets intellectually mad. He first brushes aside the
point as to the family saying that if the veterans were removed from the category of paupers konoris causa by the act
of 1879 he cannot see why this should disentitle their families to relief. He then sails into a point that the demand for
payment was defective in form because it said "Amos B.
Pomeroy and family (wife and two children now residing in
this town)" whereas in fact Pomeroy had four children. The
prior cases had held that the notice was defective unless the
persons were sufficiently identified. He says there was no evidence that more than two children were residing in the plaintiff town and that taken with the words "family" and "residing" as used in the notice the reference to children means the
two children who were living with Pomeroy in the town. He
then takes up a point that Pomeroy enlisted from the plaintiff town in 1861 and from the defendant town in 1863 and
the act of 1878 had arbitrarily made the latter prevail over
the former. He holds the act of 1878 refers back to the time
the veteran's services were rendered. He then dismisses some
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refinements as to the words "duly enlisted" by saying that
Pomeroy was sufficiently enlisted so the defendant was able
to escape from the draft quota levied on the towns in the
Civil War by claiming Pomeroy as a volunteer, and having
thus claimed him could hardly repudiate the duty to support him.' 4
As Holmes takes integrity as the ground work of the state
he takes the same view with respect to the judicial process.
The government of the state must be one of law; it must be
political and not arbitrary. The results for good or ill rest on
the people if the forms of political expression are kept free
and usable. The judicial system rests on the integrity of the
trial judge and the jury which is called in to assist in the
work. The judicial process must be grounded somewhere.
The apex of the pyramid must rest on a sound and firm base.
The judicial system rests in its entirety upon the trial courts.
It is there that the spring of justice finds its source. The illusion that justice and freedom under the law can be preserved
by maintaining a few imposing persons at the top is modern
and has no foundation in Anglo-Saxon law. That law and its
tradition as expounded by Holmes will show very clearly that
its integrity is based on the trial court. The competent and
honest craftsman, the trial judge, discharging the daily routine, is essential and the ground work of the whole structure
The integrity of the trial judges rests with the people. That
is a political matter. The correction of errors which trial
judges make in the law and the keeping of their proceedings
within the basic framework of the legal process rests with
the judges in the appellate court. The soundness of this
analysis is shown in a dramatic way by a rule which Holmes
always followed, namely, that questions of fact were finally
and irrevocably settled by the trial court. This rule prevailed
14 Inhabitants of Granville v. Inhabitants of Southampton, 138 Mass. 256
(1885). See, also, Inhabitants of West Bridgewater v. Inhabitants of Wareham, 138
Mass. 305 (1885); and City of Boston v. Inhabitants of Mount Washington, 139
Mass. 15, 20 N. E. 60 (1885).
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when the trial had been with a jury and also when it had
been before a judge alone. If the trial was by jury Holmes
would only consider on appeal the question of whether there
was any evidence presented which warranted the judge in
submitting the issue to the jury. If that was found then the
verdict was conclusive and the parties bound by it. If the
trial was before a judge he made findings which were his conclusions on the evidence. On appeal there was open ofily the
question whether there was any evidence which would in any
way lead to the findings made. Many times Holmes says in
his opinions that regardless of what conclusion the appellate
court may have as to the evidence and whether it agrees
with the lower court or not it is bound by the verdict of the
jury or the trial judge's finding. 5 He applies the same rule
to certiorari proceedings, which are writs brought to review
the findings of administrative boards.'" He insists there must
be an error of law pointed out on the face of the record. In
the findings of commissions to compute assessments based on
betterments by public improvements and bodies appointed to
value land in condemnation proceedings, he applies the same
test.' The rule is more than a rule of convenience in that the
lower court has seen and heard the witnesses. It proceeds
rather on the footing that the trial court is a political means
set up according to law and it is to be treated as proceeding
in integrity and honor and in that respect the burden rests
upon the people of the state who have control of it. It is a
body created by law. Its only limitation is that it must proceed according to law and that is the only jurisdiction which
the appellate court has over it. The point is illustrated by
the trial of John C. Best for the murder of Bailey. These men
were living alone on a remote farm at Saugus. It was known
as "Break-Heart Hill". Bailey drove the milk to town one
evening. People testified they heard the rattle of his demo15 Guteon v. Marcus, 165 Mass.
16 Ward v. Newton, 181 Mass.
Commissioners, 182 Mass. 325, 65 N.
17 De Las Casas, Petitioner, 178

335, 43 N. E. 125 (1896).
432, 63 N. E. 1064 (1902); Tileston v. Street
E. 380 (1902).
Mass. 213, 59 N. E. 664 (1901).
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crat wagon and the peculiar sound of the horses' hoofs on
the road. They also heard the same sounds in the return
journey at about nine o'clock in the evening. At about ninethirty two shots were heard from the direction of the farm.
Two weeks later parts of a body came to the surface of a
pond in the vicinity. They were collected. It was Bailey's
body. The state police went to the farm and found a Winchester rifle. They took two bullets from the trunk of Bailey's
body. They took a piece of wood and forced a bullet through
the old Winchester. The markings on all three of the lead
bullets were the same. An old lady, troubled in her sleep, had
gone to sit at the window. She heard the rattle of the wagon
at sometime after eleven. It seemed to have bags of some
kind in the back. She could make little or nothing out in the
darkness. Later the wagon repassed on its return journey to
the farm. That was the State's case. Best made a general
denial, took the stand, and stood up under Attorney General
Knowlton's cross examination. The trial was adjourned over
the week-end. Only the summing up of counsel and the
charge of the judges remained. Two judges sat at the trial of
a capital case in Massachusetts in those days. On Sunday
Best called his brother-in-law to the cell. He told him to go
to Break-Heart Hill, to go into the hay mow and take a
watch and money which were hidden under a rafter and
throw them into the sea. On Monday the brother-in-law went
on the stand. The police sped away to the farm and returned
with Bailey's watch and wallet done up in a section cut from
the old sheep coat Bailey wore. The verdict was guilty.
Holmes wrote for the Supreme Court on the appeal. Best
was defended by a man of great ability and standing at a
bar, which was remarkable. He raised many points of law
and Holmes honored him by disposing of them in detail.
Then at the end Holmes came to the motion which had been
made in the trial court to test the sufficiency of the evidence.
He outlined in pointed phrase, in a single paragraph, the
damning evidence and said the jury were fully warranted in
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finding that Best killed Bailey. Then he begins a new sentence in which he says they could have found that it was
murder in the first degree. He understood human nature so
well that with him such a crime might have sprung from a
quarrel between the two men and in hot blood. But the record showed the law had been fully explained to the jury by
the trial justices and the verdict closed the matter on appeal.1 8
The rule as to findings on the facts by the trial court was
supplemented by a further rule that the trial court could
draw reasonable inferences from the facts actually proved.
Such inferences were deemed proved just as if they had been
testified to by witnesses. Thus aperson charged with being
an idle and disorderly person, neglecting all lawful business
and habitually spending time frequenting gaming houses and
tippling shops was not entitled to a ruling that there must be
affirmative evidence she was in need of work, was physically
able to work and had an opportunity to work. There was evidence she was seen at all times of the day and night in such
places and was not seen in any lawful occupation or work.
The jury upon their general knowledge might draw inferences from these facts.19 The rule was applied in a murder
case to sustain a conviction where the body of the deceased
was burned and only the clasp of his wallet found.20 The
most effective use of this rule was made in suppressing illegal
sales of liquor. Massachusetts permitted the sale of liquor by
license. But it imposed certain limitations in the public interest. Sales to minors were not allowed. Neither were sales
to persons so intoxicated that they might become a menace
to themselves or others. Sales on Sunday were forbidden.
The licenses were of different classes, granting specific rights,
for example, one class of license gave only the power to sell
18 Commonwealth v. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N. E. 748 (1902), 181 Mass. 545,
63 N. E. 1073 (1902).
19 Commonwealth v. Doherty, 137 Mass. 245 (1884). See, also, Commonwealth v. Clifford, 145 Mass. 97, 13 N. E. 345 (1887); Doyle v. Boston & Albany
Railroad Co., 145 Mass. 386, 14 N. E. 461 (1888).
20 Commonwealth v. Wi]iams, 171 Mass. 461, go N. E. 1035 (1898).
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liquor which was not to be consumed on the premises. Enforcement of these rules was a task but it was very effectively
done. The Legislature passed a statute making it an offense
to maintain a common nuisance which by definition included
a tenement (here the word is used in the common law sense
of a building) for the illegal keeping and sale of liquor.
Where enforcement officers found violation of the rules as to
licenses they made arrests under this statute. The charges
were made before a District Court from which they went by
appeal to the Superior Court where there was a retrial before
a jury. From there the appeal was to the Supreme Judicial
Court. The course of these trials would run somewhat like
this: the police would prove a sale to two minors on a given
day or a sale to a man who was intoxicated and the putting
of beer in a can which an infant carried away. The evidence
was of course difficult to get. The defendant would then
make a complete denial and in the effort of supporting this
his entire entourage was generally brought into the sunlight.
Then the defendant would produce and prove his license. He
would ask for an instruction to the jury that he could not be
convicted of a nuisance if he had a license and a further instruction that he could not be convicted of a nuisance by
proof of illegal sales on one or two occasions. These were
refused and verdicts of guilty were frequent, judging from
the appeals reported. Holmes put an end to litigation of this
type. He pointed out that the moment the dealer stepped beyond the qualifications of the license he was under the nuisance law; that while the judges could not charge that a conviction was proper on proof of one sale they could charge
that proof of one or two sales was enough if the jury drew the
inference that the premises were being used for such sales.2 '
In another case the rule was applied in a different way. The
defendant had been unable to get a renewal of his license.
He had two rooms, the bar was in the rear room and means
21

Commonwealth v. Tabor, 138 Mass. 496 (1885); Commonwealth v. Patter-

son, 138 Mass. 498 (1885); Commonwealth v. Murray, 138 Mass. 508 (1885).
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were arranged so persons entering the place could be observed and there'were mechanical means by which the bar
could be immediately closed up. The officers found a barrel
of bottles in which there were drippings of spirituous liquors
and fifty bottles of beer covered with hay in the cellar which
was reached by a stairs from the bar. There was a verdict of
guilty under the nuisance statute. Among the points on appeal it was argued that there was no evidence of an intent to
sell. It was disposed of thus:
"We cannot pronounce the inference that the beer was kept for sale
so little warranted by the teaching of experience as to be but a mere
guess.)y 22

Two other liquor cases are mentioned because one has the
salt of wit, the other spirit. One who had a medicinal license
was caught selling for consumption on the premises. Holmes
said the conviction must be affirmed since there was no evidence that there was any necessity to drink "this dose" on the
premises.2" A lady being arrested said "We will sell liquor in
spite of all the officers of Station 1." It was offered as an admission against the husband who was present. In approving
its admission in evidence Holmes wrote in a single paragraph
a master statement of the rule as to admissions.2 4
Holmes always supported and upheld the judges of the
lower courts. He required their attention should be called to
an error at the time they made it if it was to be used later on
an appeal. In the language of the common law, an exception
must be taken.2 5 He would not reverse a judge if an examination of the whole circumstances showed that the jury could
not have been misled. In a case where it was necessary foi
the jury to decide if there was an implied invitation to the
public to cross railroad tracks at a given point the trial judge
instructed that they were to consider not what a child or
Commonwealth v. Keenan, 148 Mass. 470, 20 N. E. 101- (1889).
Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 142 Mass. 469, 8 N. E. 327 (1886).
24 Commonwealth v. Funai, 146 Mass. 570, 16 N. E. 458 (1888).
25 Trager v. Webster, 174 Mass. 580, 55 N. E. 318 (1899); Farrar v. Paine,
173 Mass. 58, 53 X. E. 146 (1899).
22
23
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woman would conclude from the invitation held out but what
an ordinary prudent and intelligent man would understand.
Holmes says that the law must have some short test and it
is that of the ordinary prudent and intelligent person, not
man against woman, but such a person against one who has
less, and he finds that is what the judge meant and the jury
reasonably understood him to mean. 6 He enforced a rule that
requests for rulings must be handed to the trial judge before
the argument was made to the jury.27 He gave the widest discretion to trial judges as to the admission of evidence that
was of doubtful value such as photographs. He places this on
the ground that the trial judge could alone say if it was instructive with respect to the case as the evidence then stood.2 8
There was broad discretion given to the trial judges as to the
effect of cumulative evidence offered as a basis for a further
trial.2 9 The trial judge passed in the first instance upon the
exceptions which were filed. If he thought they were frivolous he was not obliged to stay a sentence or execution because of the appeal.3 ° If a trial judge came on a case which
involved a difficult question of law which should be settled
in the public interest, he could report the case to the Supreme
Judicial Court. Some of these trial judges were later made
justices of the Supreme Judicial Court under the practice of
judicial promotion which was then followed in the state. Justice Braley, who filled the place made by Holmes' resignation in 1902, was one. The names of others are only called to
memory by the terse line in the official reports "The case was
heard by Dewey, J., and a jury." Their common memorial is
26 Chenery v. Fitchburg Railroad, 160 Mass. 211, 35 N. E. 554 (1893). See,
also, Thompson v. Cashman, 181 Mass. 36, 62 N. E. 976 (1902); American Mining
Co. v. Converse, 175 Mass. 449, 56 N. E. 594 (1900).
27 McMahon v. O'Connor, 137 Mass. 216 (1884); Keohane, Petitioner, 179
Mass. 69, 60 N. E. 406 (1901).
28 Verran v. Baird, 150 Mass. 141, 22 N. E. 630 (1889); Harris v. Quincy, 171
Mass. 472, 50 N. E. 1042 (1898); Wilcox v. Forbes, 173 Mass. 63, 53 N. E. 146
(1889).
29
30

Freeman v. City of Boston, 175 Mass. 208, 55 N. E. 1043 (1900).
Williams v. Clarke, 182 Mass. 316, 65 N. E. 419 (1902); Keith v. Marcus,
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in the splendid confidence which the justices of the high court
placed in them, which shines from every page of the reports,
and in the universal public respect for the law which existed
in their time.
The right to a review of all questions of law was carefully
preserved but subject to rules and statutes. Order was necessary there as elsewhere. In a case where by an error the
decision below had not been filed for a period of nine months,
Holmes reviews the case with a precision and clarity exceeding
even that which was his custom.soa If the trial judge had differences with counsel as to the exceptions which had been taken
at the trial the appellate court stepped in by a writ to settle
the exceptions and if necesasry appointed a commissioner to
report the facts to it." The right of appeal was thus preserved as one of the fundamentals of the judicial process.
On the proceedings in the appellate court Holmes was
careful to limit the case to the same aspect which it had in
the lower court. Courisel was not allowed to present an entirely different theory of the matter on the appeal. This was
in part the policy of protecting the integrity of the trial court
which has already been stated. But it had a further aspect
which was still a part of the same idea, namely, the preservation of respect for the law and its processes. In one case
Holmes says that, where one point alone was relied upon in
the trial court, the other side may not have put forth its full
strength on the different issue relied upon in the appeal.3 2
Law with Holmes was a matter of reason, but he made a distinction between reason and agility because, while the former
established confidence, the latter created fear. That in the
end might lead to disrespect for the law and its officers
among the lay public. He also knew the lawyer is by nature
3oa Goff v. Britton, 182 Mass. 293, 65 N. E. 379 (1902).
31 Keohane, Petitioner, 179 Mass. 69, 60 N. E. 406 (1901); Fitch v. Jefferson,
175 Mass. 56, 55 N. E. 623 (1899).
82 Hoseason v. Keegan, 178 Mass. 247, 59 N. E. 627 (1901); Selectmen of
Hadley, Petitioners, 178 Mass. 319, 59 N. E. 805 (1901); Gould v. Gilligan, 181
Mass. 600, 64 N. E. 409 (1902).
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a contemplative being and that his strength and his benefit to
society rests there and not in the speed at which he can jump.
In his address on Marshall he speaks of "the farther-reaching
contemplation of the lawyer"."
We stated one side of Holmes' grandeur in saying that he
had made himself a competent man. We approach another
now which is its noble supplement. If there is one single word
which would characterize the universal attitude towards
Holmes, it is confidence. This sprang not only from his competence but from the absolute equality with which he treated
lawyers and litigants in his court. This equality shines out
through the dust which rests on these old reports. Let us first
make proof of it and then indulge in observation on it. The
modem looking over these reports will most likely say: "But
what petty cases he wrote about." The remark is true but it
misses the rainbow! He wrote about small cases but when he
touched them they became alive and litigants went from his
court room with a higher respect for the equality of the law
than they had known. Smith sues the railroad over half a rod
of land. Holmes analyzes the deeds and explains the law of
abandonment. 4 White sold a mannikin for $35.00, payable
$10.00 down and $5.00 a month. The buyer will not accept
it from the express company. White sues for the contract
price. The buyer claims he is limited to the loss he sustained.
Holmes reads the contract and finds that it says delivery to
the express company was all that White must do. He cites a
case from the Queen's Bench division of the English courts.
Chief Justice Field and two associates dissent in an opinion
holding that title did not pass and White can have only his
damage."a Way delivers two buggies and a harness for Dennie
at Staughton. He asks $8.00. Dennie tenders $5.00 and offers
evidence that $2.00 per buggy was a fair charge. The railroad's charge would have been $4.00 each. Way hitched them
178 Mass. 619, 624 (1901).
Smith v. New York etc. Railroad, 163 Mass. 569, 41 N. E. 110 (1895).
34a White v. Soloman, 164 Mass. 516, 42 N. E. 104 (1895).
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to his express wagon and drove out. Holmes rules the railroad's charge was some evidence of the value and Way did
not lose his rights by delivery to plaintiff's residence rather
than his place of business.85 Hooker has converted Mrs.
Bradley's mahogany frame lounge "covered with plush, old
gold in color". He admits it but puts the value in issue. Mrs.
Bradley calls an expert who says that to anyone who likes
antique furniture it was worth $50.00 but if sold at auction
it would only bring $15 to $20. Defendant wants the reference to $50 struck out and appeals because he was refused.
And here the law meets the market place. The Chief Justice
writes. He says that in the stock exchange the buyers and
sellers are brought together in a focus and there is no danger
of missing the higher price by missing the man who would
give it. There is no such focus for old furniture and therefore
an uncertainty of encountering one who would give the highest
price reasonably possible; so the market oscillates because it
lacks a balance like the stock exchange and in regard to a
single sale and a single object there is an element of accident
which was eliminated by allowing the jury to consider both
values. 6 Mr. Goddard slipped on a banana skin at the North
Station. There were many people getting off the train and
he did not look down. There was no evidence as to how long
it had lain there. Holmes explains to him it might have been
dropped within a minute by a person getting off the train and
37
without notice he could not hold the company.
On the pages of these reports are spread the names of many
lawyers. We can pick out names of men who rose to fame in
their native state and a few who won national fame. But the
vast majority of them are now unknown. But, beside the
names of some of these forgotten ones, we find the outline of
an argument, which Holmes is about to reason down, but
which he admires enough to note down in the report. The
35 Way v. Dennie, 174 Mass. 43, 54 N. E. 347 (1999).
36 Bradley v. Hooker, 175 Mass. 142, 55 N. E. 848 (1900).
87 Goddard v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 179 Mass. 52, 60 N. E. 486 (1901).
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point Holmes looks at is not the man but what he has to present. He was preserving there the equality of the bar which
was the contribution and peculiar distinction of early American law. Holmes would surely say that he owed much to
these men. Their industry and clarity of thought stimulated
his own and they gave him the working papers from which
he forged his great opinions. He is wise enough to give back
what he takes. By holding himself thus open to all men, by
making his court a realm of ideas and not of pomp and circumstance, he drew to the law the finest industry, the best
thought and the highest devotion. Men who had eaten black
bread to win their place in the profession had their chance
before him. He knew they would give all they had. He
wanted it for himself and the greater glory of the law. Out
of such a bar rose men who could prosecute and defend a
capital case with a thoroughness and a dignity that left the
New England conscience clear when it exacted the penalty.
From it rose a Herbert Parker, never known as a wealthy
man, but as a great lawyer, to whom Governor Coolidge
could turn for solid legal advice in the crisis of the Boston
police strike, a Richard Olney and William H. Moody whom
a President of the United States called to the service of their
country, finally, those men who today sit as Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. All of these men
are signaled by one mark: their status as lawyers forever
characterized them whatever other work called them and
they never asked for any greater distinction.
The law, as Holmes understood it, was a science on which
organized society moved. It must therefore have a set of
fixed rules that it might give security and confidence. A man
must know what the consequences of his act of today will be
tomorrow in mercantile affairs and he must know today
what duties others expect of him and what rights he may demand of them. In theory, therefore, the law is fixed. The two
modifying factors are the changes in the society itself and
the fact that the law, in seeking to adjust the rights and

THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES

73

duties of individuals, has justice as its end. It is inexact therefore to speak of the fundamental forms as "technical". That
is a treacherous word and at most it can only be applied to
the procedure where it tends to defeat justice. The law of the
period we are now considering was very stern with respect to
the fundamental concepts which that society had adopted
and chose to be governed by. It was entirely free from technicality with respect to its procedure. What is more, a mighty
effort is always apparent to keep it free in that respect Over
forty of Holmes' opinions can be cited on that point. The
plaintiffs were riding in a horse and buggy which they owned
in common. They and the horse and buggy were injured by
the defendant's negligence. It was claimed that the torts for
the personal injury were distinct from each other and yet
had to be joined with the injury to the property and they
each had filed separate declarations. Holmes said it was too
late to raise the point after the evidence was in. And he went
on to say that whatever "sua" meant in the early writs "the
plaintiff's carriage" and "the plaintiff's horse" were satisfied
by proof of any interest sufficient to support an action. 8 An
indictment for adultery did not read that the act was against
the peace and against the statute. A statute of the state said
an indictment should not be quashed on such grounds. It was
argued that the statute was unconstitutional. Holmes held
that while a statute could not authorize the omission to describe a specific crime, yet technical and formal objections of
the nature presented were not constitutional rights. 9
We may leave these to look briefly at the law operating on
the society of that day. The liquor situation has already been
discussed. We therefore pass to the other aspects of the criminal law. One of the early opinions Holmes wrote in this field
was the case of a physician who was indicted for manslaughter because he directed the application of flannels soaked in
kerosene to a patient by which she was burned and from
38

Meaney v. Kehoe, 181 Mass. 424, 63 N. E. 925 (1902).
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which she died. The evidence showed the treatment was continued after the patient complained and that another patient
had been so treated and badly burned. There was a verdict
of guilty. The defendant on the appeal relied upon an earlier
Massachusetts case which said the killing must be a consequence of some unlawful act and a prescription could be
made for a person with his consent if it was honestly intended
to cure him. Holmes said the case was wrong in some of its
implications. He defined moral recklessness as a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of acts, depending upon an actual condition of mind. Here an external
standard must be applied of what would be recklessness in a
man of ordinary prudence. This he says is the rule governing
the redistribution of losses and there is equal reason for applying it in the criminal law.4 °
A person was employed to ascertain the price of certain
land. The price was $125.00. He reported the price as $325,
made up as follows: $300 for the owners of the land, $15 for
the real estate agent and $10 for the defendant. The employer came to defendant's office and defendant said, "Pay
over the money". It was counted out and laid on the table.
The. defendant picked it up, went into another room, paid
the real estate agent $125 and put the rest in his pocket. He
was indicted and convicted of larceny. The defendant's counsel argued that since the employer had voluntarily turned the
money over there could be no conviction for larceny which
was a taking without consent. Holmes sustained the conviction on several grounds: the money was only in the defendant's custody while title and possession (in the legal sense)
were in the employer; if the money was obtained by a trick
the possession was fraudulent and the employer did not part
with title; while defendant had the right to take $10 out of
the money it all belonged to the employer until that right was
exercised and the defendant had appropriated the whole.4
40
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Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884).
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The defendant was a bar tender and the master, suspecting
he was being cheated, hired detectives to make purchases
with marked bills. The defendant did not ring up the sale but
dropped the bills in the till and when it was opened on a later
sale took them out and they were found on his person. An
indictment was laid in embezzlement. The defendant asked
the trial judge to instruct the jury that the crime was larceny
and not embezzlement. This was based on the fact that the
evidence showed the bills were actually in the till and on the
further point that the bills were the master's money which he
had given to the detectives for the purpose. Holmes pointed
out that under the early common law there would be embezzlement if the servant was not a custodian. Statutes passed
in the time of Henry VIII made conversion of goods by a
servant a felony and many refinements had grown up around
the rule that whether or not the servant was a custodian
turned on the place of deposit and the master's control; the
mere presence of the bills in the till for a few moments was
not enough, and on that, the intention with which the defendant put them there was important, since the control he was
exercising depended on the defendant himself; that when all
was said and done the defendant only was deprived of the
right to claim he was guilty of larceny when he was convicted of embezzlement.42
In an indictment for breaking and entering, one of the defendants got in by pretense of making a purchase. When the
clerk went downstairs to get the goods, this defendant unbarred the door and let in the second who hid himself and
remained and broke the till. Holmes ruled that there was
breaking and entering if the second defendant never touched
4
the door because he was let in by the hand of an accomplice. 3
In an indictment for the abuse of a female child a complaint which she made to her mother the next morning was
let in evidence. In ruling on the exception Holmes explained
42
48
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that at the very early law a person was obliged to make a hue
and cry when he was wronged if he wished to appeal to the
courts in the matter; that this curious rule had survived in
cases of attacks upon women, and as an arbitrary rule; Lord
Hale had justified its admission as corroborating evidence
but it could not be justified by any modern rule of evidence;
that it could not be excluded as not part of the res gestae
because of its arbitrary nature and it rested with the trial
judge to make a preliminary finding that it was not too late
under all of the circumstances which had occurred."'
In an indictment for an attempt to set fire to property; defendant used the first floor and basement as a shop for painting and repairing carriages and the upper stories as a dwelling, the building was insured but there was a mortgage under
which the insurance was payable and also insurance on the
personal property. The city marshal, advised by an informer,
visited the premises at night. In the varnish room he found a
dish pan full of turpentine in which there was a block of
wood weighted down by irons. It was surrounded by excelsior
and wooden boxes which had been saturated with turpentine.
On a shelf was a thick slow-burning candle which had not
been used. The informer testified he had worked for defendant and had been laid off, that on July 5th defendant had
called him to a hotel and said the business was in a bad way
and he was in debt and offered the informer $25 and then
$50 to go and light the candle and place it on the block of
wood in the pan, which the informer refused to do; but he had
entered the building and seen the arrangement. The same
night he was with the defendant at Salem who asked him to
get a team and drive with him to Beverly where the building
was; that after driving to within a quarter of a mile of the
place the defendant said he had changed his mind and they
drove back to Salem; that the informer then reported to the
city marshal. The indictment alleged an attempt but con44

Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 51 N. E. 746 (1898).

THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES

77

tained no allegation of the solicitation of another to light the
collected materials or take part in the acts alleged. Holmes
said the statute relied upon was not intended to punish every
act done toward the commission of a crime but only acts
done in an attempt to commit it. When natural forces are
set in motion which would bring about the result except for
an unforseen interruption-for example, if the candle had
been lit and put out by the police, there is an attempt. The
same applies where an act is done but fails by an error in
judgment, as firing with a pistol and missing. In such cases
the criminal has done his last act. But when first steps are
taken and other acts remain to be done there is a chance for
a change of mind. Attempt suggests an act seemingly sufficient to accomplish the end. Here the mere collection of materials without a present intent was too remote. If the offense
was to be made out by successful solicitation of another to
do it, that being the defendant's last act, the solicitation
must be alleged. The evidence of solicitation was properly
admitted on the issue of intent but it could not be relied upon
45
as an overt act as it was not so set out.
The Commonwealth v. Storti presented a legal battle
which just falls short in its determination of a similar case
which arose after Holmes' day. Storti, who is described in
the reports as a subject of the King of Italy, was found guilty
by a jury of murder in the first degree. On the appeal the
case was argued on the sufficiency of the indictment which
contained two counts. The first was drawn under the common law and the second which was drawn under a statute of
1889 was a mere recital that the defendant and anofher had
beat the deceased with an ax and killed and murdered him.
They were both. descriptions of the same act. The first count
was admitted to be good and the verdict had been a general
one upon the whole indictment. It was argued that it could
not be said the jury had not acted on the second count and
45
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it was claimed that that count and the statute authorizing it
was a violation of the Bill of Rights.. Holmes pointed out,
that without giving any countenance to the suggestion, the
two counts were for the same offense and the evidence justified a verdict of guilty under either, therefore, no constitutional issue was involved. A number of questions as to the
admissibility of evidence were raised and disposed of and
the verdict was found to be within the law.4 6 The sentence
of death had recently been subject to legislative action
whereby its execution was changed from hanging to electrocution. After the case had been disposed of by the Supreme
Judicial Court upon the merits, a writ of error was taken on
the sentence and a petition of habeas corpus was sued out
against the warden of the state prison. These were based
upon the point that the punishment was cruel or unusual, in
violation of the Bill of Rights, and that it was in fact cruel
and unusual and of uncertain character. Thereby the punishment was gotten before the court as a question of law and
also of fact. On the issue of fact the lower court took evidence and found that if electricity is properly applied it is
necessarily fatal, causes death practically instantaneously,
and in causing death is more speedy, less painful and more
humane than is hanging, that it is not uncertain in character
and does not necessitate "a remote combination of circumstances circuitously affecting the functions of organic life by
secret and invisible means" as claimed by the petitioner. The
writs were refused. On the appeal Holmes said he would put
all issues of procedure aside, that there was but a single punishment prescribed, death; that while you cannot separate
the means from the end, the means here was chosen to reach
the end as simply and painlessly as possible; that the word
"unusual" as used in the constitution must be construed with
the word cruel and was not so broad as to include every humane improvement not previously known; that while means
might be adopted which would have to be considered part of
46
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the punishment, here they were chosen because they were instantaneous; that mental suffering was not more horrible
because one was to be struck by lightning rather than to be
hanged with the chance of slowly strangling; the general fear
of death the law meant to be felt; that the warden had discretion as to any day in a given week was not intended to
enhance the suspense but of a humane purpose and the uncertainty is not a part of the punishment.4" This judgment
was given the day following the argument. But there was
more to come. There were further delays and Storti became
sick and the Legislature passed a statute amending in some
respects the right of visitation, in requiring identification of
the family, and approval of the warden as to advisers, and
providing that where an execution was respited by the governor or delayed by process of law the warden might in his
discretion remove the prisoner from the execution place and
confine him in the solitary prison. A writ of habeas corpus
was sued out claiming the right of access had been cut down
and solitary confinement had been substituted and was ex
post facto and void. On the appeal Holmes pointed out that
the solitary prison was one for separate confinement, that the
prisoner had not been in solitary confinement and the act had
been passed to mitigate his lot; the amendment as to access
was by way of clarification only; that it was never intended
that any one could walk in by saying he was a member of the
prisoner's family or his adviser, that the original act was not
intended to confer rights on the prisoner but was directed to
prison discipline.4"
As a branch of the criminal law Holmes construed statutes
forbidding lotteries, pools and betting on horse races. These
statutes opened the way to a maze of technical defenses and
subtle distinctions as to whether the offense charged was
within the statute. The lotteries statutes came before the
courts first. It was put to Holmes that a policy or envelope
47
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game was a wager and not a lottery. He said a wager is
executory and decided by events aside from the action of the
parties. Here it was determined by a mechanical device."
When the trial judges followed this ruling cases were appealed on distinctions of fact and Holmes said it had been
found to be a lottery and there was no need of going on taking the opinion of juries forever." When the officers came
into a room with many people in it and testified to the implements in use and transactions going on the defendants insisted the state should trace one transaction all the way
through. This went down under the inference rule which has
been already stated.5 Finally the Legislature passed a statute making it an offense to be present in places where bets
were registered and the issues became simpler. 2 Statutes
were also enacted against offering prizes as an inducement to
buy merchandise. These did not fare so well with Holmes.
Reading them literally he upheld the right of a tobacco dealer to give away prizes of pictures of "notorious men and
women" with a purchase 5 and when the trading stamp made
its way into New England, that also was held beyond the
statute on the ground the nature of the gift was known at
the moment of purchase and Holmes distinguished a previous
decision of the court made in Commonwealth v. Emerson,
165 Mass. 146.11
A statute was enacted forbidding the sale of any oleomargarine unless the public was advised of its real nature and it
was free from coloration to make it look like butter. Holmes
enforced the coloration provision on the ground that it was
directed against resales after the first buyer had been warned
as required by the act. 5 Later he held as a fact that the subCommonwealth v. Wright, 137 Mass. 250 (1884).
50 Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 146 Mass. 142, 15 N. E. 491 (1888).
51 Op. cit. supra note 50.
52 Commonwealth v. Healey, 157 Mass. 455, 32 N. E. 656 (1892).
53 Commonwealth v. Emerson, 165 Mass. 146, 42 N. E. 559 (1896).
54 Commonwealth v. Sisson, 178 Mass. 578, 60 N. E. 385 (1901).
55 Commonwealth v. Russell, 162 Mass. 520, 39 N. E. 110 (1895).
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stance could be made without coloring and without conceding that the legislative finding on the matter could be disputed.56 He also overrode technical defenses "'abut later the
statute was amended to make the possession of the substance
with intent to sell it an offense.57
In the field of domestic relations one or two definite
courses of public policy are apparent in the cases and there
is also a field where Holmes appears ready to go further than
the thought of the day. Massachusetts asserted its right to
maintain jurisdiction over the marriage relationship and its
duties and rights when the state was the matrimonial domicile. The point came before the court in 1900. Kate Andrews
applied for letters of administration on the estate of C. S.
Andrews. She had been married to him in Massachusetts. He
had been divorced from her in South Dakota. He had then
married Annie Andrews who also appeared and claimed the
letters as the lawful wife. The South Dakota statute required
residence in good faith for a period of ninety days in order to
maintain the action there. It was found Andrews had lived
there for ninety days and obtained a divorce for a cause not
recognized in Massachusetts. It was also found he intended
to come back to Massachusetts after he did what was needful
to obtain the divorce. Kate Andrews had appeared in the
South Dakota court and denied Andrews' residence and after
having been paid a sum of money by Andrews directed her
counsel to withdraw. Holmes wrote that there was a distinction between cases where parties have submitted to the
power of a court and where they have not. If they have they
may not question the judgment as to jurisdiction any more
than on the merits; but the state of domicile, Massachusetts,
has an interest; it has declared by statute it will be governed
by the facts as to domicile and so that issue must be tried and
found; the statute does not go beyond constitutional powers
56 Commonwealth v. Kelly, 163 Mass. 169, 39 N'. E. 776 (1895).
56a Commonwealth v. Mullen, 176 Mass. 132, 57 N. E. 331 (1900).
57 Commonwealth v. Ryberg, 177 Mass. 67, 58 N. E. 155 (1900).
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since it is confined to persons who have retained a domicile
in the state; the decree is void in Massachusetts for all purposes and Kate Andrews gets the benefit of it regardless of
connivance; she only remained silent and that is not an
estoppel; she is entitled to the letters.58
In a case which came up fourteen years earlier the jurisdiction over the status of married persons had not only been
declared but also the right to reach it by publication. The
parties were married in Massachusetts. The wife still resides
in Massachusetts and sues for separate support and other relief. The husband lives in New York. He appears specially
and says he was served with the petition in New York and
by publication. Holmes wrote that the domicile of the wife
did not follow that of the defendant when the separation was
without her fault; jurisdiction did not depend on service in
the state; the decree would be at least valid in the state; that
is clear as to the custody of the child and protection of the
plaintiff's person, it is more difficult as to the payment of
money; the proceeding is for the regulation of a status subject to regulation by Massachusetts; an order to pay money
is not an isolated obligation but a duty incident to the status;
it is not given extraterritorial force but that is not the test; it
is enforcible against property in Massachusetts.50
The basis of the rule is made clear in an opinion of 1887.
The parties were married in New Hampshire and lived and
separated there and went to Massachusetts living separately
there. The husband sued for divorce. Holmes wrote that the
statute only gave the action where the parties had lived in
the state as husband and wife and the husband must establish the statutory residence.6"
The law compelled the husband to support the wife and
made him liable for her necessaries to others by an implied
Andrews v. Andrews, 176 Mass. 92, 57 N. E. 333 (1900).
59 Blackinton v. Blackinton, 141 Mass. 432, 5 N. E. 830 (1886).
60 Weston v. Weston, 143 Mass. 274, 9 N. E. 597 (1887).
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agency." But it gave the wife no right to interfere with the
husband's property or his disposal of it. Two cases came before the court upon that issue and the second tested the rule
to the limit. The wife sued in equity after the husband's
death to set aside transfers of real estate and personal property made in his life time to his nephew and his nephew's
wife. She got a finding from a master that the transfers were
without consideration and evidence was presented that the
husband had made statements that he had so arranged things
that the wife would get none of his property. In the earlier
case the right to convey property even where it was alleged
to have been done collusively, the husband being still alive,
had been upheld by Holmes 62 and in still another case the
court held conveyances based on dislike of a wife to be bad."
Here the master found the principal purpose was to defraud
the wife. There was in the record however some evidence of
care bestowed upon the husband by the nephew. Holmes
writing for his court went at it in this way: the husband had
a right to convey regardless of his foresight of the effect on
his wife's interest; motive does not affect validity; it is material in the case of creditors where there is a right, irrespective of motive; it had not been intended in the earlier case
to hold all conveyances based on dislike of the wife were
bad; there, control had been retained; here, there was an
out-and-out conveyance. He then examines the evidence and,
as far as consideration could be found, it is sustained and the
remainder declared void. 4 In other cases Holmes sustained
the wife's right to her separate property against the husband's fraudulent acts. 5
In weighing these human relations Htolmes reached back
to the realities. Where a railway company was sued for loss
Baldwin v. Foster, 138 Mass. 449 (1885).
Goodnow v. Shattuck, 136 Mass. 223 (1884).
63 Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N. E. 251 (1899).
64
Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N. E. 1068 (1902).
65 Weatherbee v. New York Life Insurance Co., 178 Mass. 575, 60 N. E. 381
(1901); Otis v. Otis, 167 Mass. 245, 45 N. E. 737 (1897).
61
62

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

of the society and services of a wife because of negligence
resulting in her injury he upheld the trial judge in admitting
evidence that it was the plaintiff's custom to kick his wife
with his boots on and police officers had to frequently regulate the household. He found the trial judge had limited the
evidence to the issue of damages and he let it stand.6 6 In an
action for alienation of a wife's affections brought against her
relatives and based upon suggestions they had made to the
wife, the trial judge allowed the defendants to testify they
had acted thus "to befriend them both, what I thought was
for their best interest". Holmes upheld this. He pointed out
the advice would have been ineffective except for the wife's
act, a married woman was presumably capable of receiving
advice to separate from her husband without losing her reason or responsibility; good intention will not excuse slander
but to be answerable for advice it must not represent real
opinion.67 In another of this class of cases we could find
Holmes in his entirety if all his remaining work were destroyed. A couple in middle age took a child from an orphan
asylum and brought her up. She was married years later and
continued to live in her adopted home. Then she went to live
in a house which the couple had given her. The wife died and
the man remarried. The couple had never adopted the child.
In 1901 the orphan brought an action against the man's estate based on services from 1870 to 1887 on an account annexed in which she set off against herself board and clothing.
There was a second count upon a contract made in 1892 to
pay for past services in consideration of a promise to render
future service. There was a third count based on a representation made in 1870 that the deceased would adopt the plaintiff and allegations she had relied upon it and rendered services and she was deceived. She supported the contract claims
by testifying as to conversations with the deceased. Her husband testified that on going to a hospital in 1893 the de66

Sullivan v. Lowell & Dacut Railway, 162 Mass. 536, 39 N. E. 185 (1895).
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Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 26 N. E. 417 (1891).
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ceased had asked him to look out for the house and he would
pay for the past and future services and pay well. Another
witness testified he heard the deceased say he would pay the
plaintiff and pay her well. The trial judge applied the statute
of limitations. But that left the second count based on the
alleged contract of 1892. He refused to submit that or the
third count to the jury. He let the case go to the jury on the
services claimed to have been rendered from 1890 to 1893
and the plaintiff had a verdict for $114.75. She appealed.
Holmes wrote for the court: The plaintiff's case must go
on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation as to the
statutes and that the law will imply a contract in aid of
justice; but since the remedy is an action for tort a contract cannot be implied; the strong ground of the case is that
the deceased made a new promise in consideration of the
plaintiff's continuing to care for him; this would cover the
past and future services; there is no trouble about the sufficiency of the consideration and it is not reached by the statute of limitations but it goes on the meaning of the evidence
and none of it by fair construction relates to the period when
the plaintiff was living in the house as a girl or young unmarried woman." One more case belongs in this group. In 1901
a petition was filed in the Probate Court claiming the right
of administration had been wrongly given to the defendants
as the heirs at law of Robert Irving otherwise known as Sheridan W. Ford and that the petitioner and Julia Anne Brown
were alone entitled as heirs. In 1846 Ford was a slave in Virginia. Julia Ann Gregory was also a slave. Julia's master performed a marriage ceremony between them and pronounced
them man and wife. Three children were born and the petitioner is the survivor. In 1854, to evade being sold, Irving
escaped to Massachusetts and took the name of Ford. Julia
was imprisoned so she might not escape. She did not hear of
Irving for eleven years and had married another slave and
after his death another. Clarissa David had also escaped from
68 Graham v. Stanton, 177 Mass. 321, 58 N. E. 1023 (1901).
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slavery in Virginia and went to Massachusetts. She lived
with Ford and there is a marriage certificate among her papers. Two children were born. The respondent to whom the
letters were granted is one of them. After the Civil War the
children who were born in Virginia visited at Ford's home in
Massachusetts and Ford went to Virginia and recognized the
petitioner as his son. A Virginia statute passed in 1866 provided all colored people who were living together at that time
who had agreed to occupy the relation of husband and wife
would be deemed so whether rites had been solemnized or
not and all children recognized by the man would be deemed
legitimate. The lower court found for the respondent. Holmes
wrote on the appeal: the common law as to marriage would
not have applied in Virginia to slaves; the statute shows
that; the statute hardly applies, but assuming that it did, the
marriage in Massachusetts must be found void if the petitioner is to succeed; a slave brought into Massachusetts
could not be removed against his will; a runaway slave had a
de facto freedom until it was terminated; he could sue in the
courts; the state would not have tolerated the idea he had
the incapacity of a slave; if he could sue he could marry;
marriages in slave states could be ratified after freedom
under slave state laws; the trial court found the Virginia
marriage was not valid in fact; whether the petitioner could
share in the estate was not decided.6 9
In the matter of contracts between husband and wife,
while they had to be made through a third person as trustee,
they were upheld in many cases during this period. Holmes
dissented when the court held a contract granting the wife
consideration for returning after she left the husband was
invalid. The majority thought the relationship could not be
discarded or resumed for money. Holmes put it on a straight
legal ground, she had a right to sue for divorce and a right
not to return. Giving up these was sufficient consideration
69
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and a lawful act might be mingled with other motives.7" In a
later case Holmes wrote for the majority in upholding an
agreement made in North Carolina valid under the laws of
that state between husband and wife which related to Massachusetts lands and which would not have been valid if made
between a husband and wife in Massachusetts.
There are two classes of litigation that brought numerous
cases before Holmes in the field of business relations, namely,
insolvency and poor debtor's bonds. The latter arose on executions on judgments. The debtor was required to appear
and be examined. He was required to give a bond for his appearance in order to avoid arrest. If on the examination it
appeared he had no means and had not fraudulently contracted the debt, he was allowed to take the poor debtor's
oath.72 This and the trustee process for reaching property in
the hands of third persons were the means of enforcing judgments. 3 Where the debt was for necessaries the court had
power to make a decree directing payments in fixed amounts
at set times and failure to comply without good cause was a
contempt of court. Holmes held the act was valid: the fact
that the particular courts empowered to enforce it did not
exist in all parts of the state did not create special privileges
and practical necessities of administration do not conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; preferences as to classes of creditors have always
existed; it made purchases of necessaries easier by giving a
means of reaching those who wilfully avoided paying for
them; a jury trial was not constitutionally necessary since
the proceeding was based on a valid judgment; the judge
must be satisfied the refusal to pay was without just cause,
there was no right to even have this question asked and therefore no choice as to whether it should be answered by a judge
or jury; a court need not resort to a jury to determine if a
70
71
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defendant is obeying its decree; the imprisonment is not punishment but means of compelling obedience; until he obeys,
the statute, and not the Constitution, is the limit of his
liability. 74
The state administered its own insolvency system and evidently assignees were very diligent in the discharge of their
offices. They litigated to set aside transfers and to avoid
preferences. The test laid down on preferences was whether
the preferred creditor had reasonable cause to know of the
insolvent's condition " and insolvency was defined as inability to pay debts in due course. 76 Holmes also held foreign
77
property could not be reached by the state proceedings
and foreign debts were not discharged.7" The last rule was
applied by him to a case where the foreign creditor had qualified as a foreign corporation in Massachusetts, had a place
of business there and delivered the goods from there. Holmes
went on the ground that the domicile of the corporation was
in the state where it was organized. Chief Justice Field dissented, holding the foreign corporation had brought itself
within the state by authorizing the commissioner of corporations to accept service for it in any legal proceeding.7 9 Holmes
dealt with debts created after the assignment had become
operative by holding they had not gone to swell the fund
being administered and therefore could not participate.8"
This doctrine of unjust enrichment if applied to contingent
claims in bankruptcy would have avoided endless uncertainty
and litigation.
Trade mark and trade name litigation were frequent in the
state courts at that period and Holmes made many fundamental contributions to that law especially in explaining the
James W. Brown's Case, 173 Mass. 498, 53 N. E. 998 (1899).
Cozzens v. Holt, 136 Mass. 237 (1884).
Peabody v. Knapp, 153 Mass. 242, 26 N. E. 696 (1891).
77 Chipman v. Manufacturer's National Bank, 156 Mass. 147, 30 N. E. 610
(1892); Chase v. Henry, 166 Mass. 577, 44 N. E. 988 (1896).
78 Phoenix National Bank v. Batcheller, 151 Mass. 589, 24 N. E. 917 (1890).
79 Berger & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154 (1898).
80 Spurr v. Dean, 139 Mass. 84, 28 N. E. 452 (1885).
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background and nature of the rules which regulate it. He tells
us that, while an exclusive right to use words as an advertisement may have a considerable money value, yet money value
is not a conclusive reason for recognizing rights, that when
the common law developed the doctrine of trade marks and
trade names it was not developing a property in advertisements more absolute than it would have allowed the author
of "Paradise Lost" but its intention was to prevent one man
from palming off his goods as another's, from getting another's business or injuring his reputation by unfair means and
perhaps from defrauding the public." He points out that a
trade mark cannot be transferred apart from the good will of
a business. It must truly indicate a point of origin. 2 He
pointed out that, while there could be no monopoly in the
color of a label, still a universal element when used and
claimed only in connection with a sufficiently complex combination of other things, would create a right.83 He held the
cigar makers' union label was a trade mark under the state
statute and the labor union was a person authorized to register a label under the act.84 In the Waltham watch case, he
held that a geographical name may acquire a secondary
meaning and become associated with a person's goods so as
to put later corners to the trouble of taking reasonable precautions from diverting the first corner's customers. 5 He held
that abandonment of a trade mark even when it continued
for four years was a question of fact.8"
In the world of affairs Holmes explained the origin of the
caveat emptor rule, "let the buyer beware", as arising out of
allowance for the weakness of human nature, because it was
not thought desirable to interfere too much by helping men
Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 28 N. E. 1068 (1900).
Op. cit. supra note 81.
88 New England Awl Co. v. Marlborough Awl Co., 168 Mass. 154, 46 N. E.
386 (1897).
84 Tracy v. Banker, 170 Mass. 266, 49 N. E. 308 (1898).
85 American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85.
53 N. E. 141 (1899).
86 Burt v. Tucker, 178 Mass. 493, 59 N. E. 1111 (1901).
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in their voluntary transactions more than they help themselves and because if they claim the representation essential
they can make it so by requiring a warranty.8 7 He upheld the
right of a proprietor of a patent medicine to make a contract
restricting the price of resale on the ground the agreement
was a license which could be limited.8 He took the view that
the courts would be astute to discover consideration for the
purpose of upholding business transactions seriously entered
into when they were made with the intention of binding the
parties.8 9 The railroads of the time were in the habit of issuing bonds with a provision that they were convertible into
stock. As time went on consolidations of the various roads
followed and the conversion right became an advantage. The
bonds would then be tendered to the consolidated company
and the stock demanded. The consolidations were pursuant
to special statutes. In the first of these cases upon which
Holmes wrote, the statute provided that the consolidated
company was to take over the constituent company subject
to its duties, debts and liabilities and its claims and contracts
might be enforced by and against the consolidated company.
Holmes held these words were too strong and the contract of
the constituent company could at least be enforced in its
terms or damages must be paid.9" The matter was very
shortly put before the court again by the same defendant and
this time argued upon the ground that the contract went out
of existence when the constituent company ceased to exist by
reason of the consolidation. Holmes wrote again and said
that identity might be preserved for certain purposes and
here the legislative intent was clearly to continue the old corporation for the purpose of carrying the old contract obligaBurns v. Lane, 138 Mass. 350 (1885).
88 Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72, 58 N. E. 174 (1900).
89 French v. Boston National Bank, 179 Mass. 404, 60 N. E. 793 (1901);
Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 158 Mass. 194, 33 N. E. 495 (1893) ; Wheeler v. Klaholt, 178 Mass. 141, 59 N. E. 756 (1901).
90 John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Worcester, Nashua & Rochester Railroad Co., 149 Mass. 214, 21 N. E. 364 (1889).
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tions over.9 1 Richard Olney argued these cases. Ten years
later he brought the same subject matter before the court
again with respect to a street railway organization. The
plaintiff rested upon the two prior cases which Olney had
lost. Holmes writes for his court. "I think myself they were
decided rightly" he begins. But he says it was but an option
the present plaintiff had, and this was but a hope that the
company would continue. The Legislature had limited the
stock to be issued by the consolidated company and left none
to cover these bonds. That indicates the Legislature intended
to terminate the constituent company and the option ended
with it.92 When the Boston and Maine Railroad and the
Fitchburg Railroad consolidated, the protesting stockholders
in each company were entitled under the statute to have
their stock valued and to be paid off. Stockholders who had
voted for the consolidation at their respective corporation
meetings later brought proceedings to have their stock
valued. Holmes turned them out." The reorganization of the
Vermont Central Railway came before the Massachusetts
Courts upon a constitutional issue by reason of a suit being
brought in Massachusetts for the value of grain destroyed
in Ogdenburg, New York. The consolidating statute passed
by the Vermont Legislature did not mention the claim now
made as among those the reorganized company was to assume. The statute was enacted in 1898 and it contained a
provision that it was subject to alteration, amendment or
repeal as the public good might require. In 1900 the Vermont
Legislature passed an amendment requiring the consolidated
company to pay the claims on which the present action is
based. The defendant rested on the point that the amendment was unconstitutional. Holmes, with a magnificent deference, wished that the matter could have been presented to
91 Day v. Worcester, Nashua & Rochester Railroad Co., 151 Mass. 302, 23 N.

E. 824 (1890).
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Parkinson v. West End Street Railway Co., 173 Mass. 446, 53 N. E. 891
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the courts of Vermont whose constitution was involved but
found the case was squarely before the court and there was
no escape from facing the question. He pointed out that the
second statute is in no way a corrective of the first, that it is
not claimed that there was any intention to include such
claims under the first statute and no claim that they were
omitted by a mistake; the amendment requires private property to be applied to a private use and encounters the express prohibition against that sort of thing in the Vermont
constitution; the statute must fail unless it rests within the
power to amend which was reserved; the power to amend is
not a confiscation clause beyond the constitutional restriction; the power reserved by the right to amend is by its terms
to be exercised in "the public good" and that can hardly require the defendant to pay another person's debts. It should
be stated to supply the background that the Central Vermont
had become insolvent and the consolidated corporation had
been permitted to take it over by foreclosure. 4
In the field of corporation law the court, writing through
Holmes, upheld agreements which were the forerunners of
the modem voting trust agreements. They touch these matters with a fundamental sense and reason. The agreement
was for "gain and advantage" says Holmes. But it was not
thereby unlawful unless the gain was at the expense of the
corporation or a wrong was worked to other stockholders
and such matters if they are to be regarded with suspicion
are to be considered upon the basis of proof.95 There is a
reasonableness about this and hopefulness and also a competency which makes one believe that an economic society
could work out its destiny under the guidance of such men.
Their vision seems to encompass the whole of life. The court,
again through Holmes, upheld the validity of covenants in a
stock certificate that the shares would not be sold without
94
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first offering them for sale to the Board of Directors. The
stock he says was called into existence with the restrictions
in it by the consent of all concerned and a corporation is still
a personal relationship in which those involved may choose
their associates.96 In still another case he explains the basis
of the liability of a corporation for the contracts of its promoters. The fact that the corporation was not a party to the
contract under common law rules did not end the matter.
The corporation might have acted on the contract with
knowledge of its terms, there might be an implied undertaking to perform the contract. He does not turn the plaintiff out
of court but sends him back to the Superior Court so he may
consider amendments in his declaration. There is a largeness
of view and a competence and this attribute is not claimed
by the judge but is assigned to the law itself.97
Insurance was a subject of much litigation. Some cases are
concerned with defenses raised under clauses in the policy
and the clause against sale or transfer of the property is a
favorite topic arising out of cases where there is a transfer
between partners, and assignment of the policy as collateral.98 But the bulk of the litigation is concerned with the necessity of the court interfering in fraternal benefit organizations. "The Supreme Lodge of The Golden Lion" is one of
these and is not the only fantastic title which we meet.
Holmes examines these benefit certificates, the by-laws and
the constitutions, the financial background. We might have
said that he never becomes exasperated but now we must
limit ourselves to saying that it takes considerable to exasperate him so that he shows it. In one case he examines the
whole structure and points out that the reserve fund in such
a business increases as people drop out and thereby terminate
any rights which they have in it. He finds that the benefits
96 Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N. E. 934 (1902).
97 Holyoke Envelope Co. v. United States Envelope Co., 182 Mass. 171, 65

N. E. 54 (1902).

98 Powers v. Guardian Insurance Co., 136 Mass. 108 (1883) ; Lynde v. Newark
Fire Insurance Company, 139 Mass. 57, 29 N. E. 222 (1885).
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when considered in reference to payments indicate that at
some time assessments must fall thick and fast with the consequence that many will be forced out. The courts cannot
say such a business is fraudulent because the Legislature has
authorized it. But it is one where the legislative requirements
will be strictly enforced. The people who went into it were
poor and did not understand the nature of the contract but
the representations are promissory and the court cannot say
wholesale that the parties should have more consideration
than those making a contract usually get; the business
should be wound up before more- are crowded out by the
assessment war; that however does not warrant a court in
acting; but it is found as a fact below that the society employs paid agents; that is contrary to the statute; the fund
is a trust fund; the certificate holders may stand where they
are and refuse to pay and not incur forfeiture; a receiver will
be appointed and the fund distributed.9 9 The by-laws of the
"American Legion of Honor" came before the court ten years
later. The plaintiff's husband took out a certificate in 1888
for $5000. The certificate was subject to the by-laws now
existing "or hereafter adopted". Deceased had paid in until
his death. In 1900 the by-laws were changed so the highest
amount to be paid on death was $2000. Holmes held that
"compliance" with the by-laws referred to paying the assessments; the certificate was a contract and the submitting to
the by-laws intended did not extend to deductions from the
face of a certificate any ordinary man would be led to believe
00
secure.
The court was able to reach and penetrate all kinds and
forms of fraud including fraudulent sales of stockOa It exercised a capacity to get at that form of activity whether the
corporation belonged in New Hampshire'o' or the land was
99 Fogg v. Supreme Lodge of The Golden Lion, 196 Mass. 431, 31 N. E. 289
(1892).
100 Newhall v. American Legion of Honor, 181 Mass. 111, 63 N. E. 1 (1902).
100a Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 11 N. E. 938 (1887).
101 Windram v. French, 151 Mass. 547, 24 N. E. 914 (1890).
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in Florida' 2 or the personal property involved was in Rhode
Island." 3 Words of hopeful encouragement sounding only in
prophecy were not a basis of claim because it was a society
that looked for some competency in its members in their
transactions."0 4 The prospectus must have been relied on."'
The fraud must have resulted in actual damage and not be a
paper claim or the pretender would run into a line of technical rules which would blow his hat off.' But the court
understood the old-fashioned word "cheat". It used it sometimes, 10 and it was always able to reach transactions where
there was actual misrepresentation.1 O° a Frauds on municipali 7
ties fared no better. Members of a committee on streets who
bought horses and then sold them to a dummy who in turn
sold them to the city at a considerable advance in price and
through the committee, found that the court knew a great
deal about the criminal law of conspiracy. 0 8 A town could
not by way of gift discharge the account of a tax collector
over the objection of a minority at a town meeting.'0 9 Making false returns to the city of Boston's disbursing officers as
to the number of men and teams which had worked on a job
and upon which the contractor was paid was held to be a
breach of an agent's trust and unusually large bank accounts
were held to be evidence which might be considered in relation to the other evidence." 0 Planting imported voters in a
party caucus for the nomination of candidates for public
office caused Holmes to write more extensively than was his
custom on constitutional and statutory interpretation, the
nature of conspiracy and the nature of the evidence admis102 Whiting v. Price, 169 Mass. 576, 48 N. E. 772 (1897).
103 Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 172 Mass. 248, 52 N. E. 77 (1898).
104 Hall v. First National Bank, 173 Mass. 16, 53 N. E. 154 (1899); Deming
v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 20 N. E. 107 (1889).
105 Op. cit supra note 100a; Gilfillan v. Mawhinney, 149 Mass. 264, 21 N. E.
299 (1889).
106 Latham v. Aldrich, 166 Mass. 156, 44 N. E. 137 (1896).
107 Op. cit. supi'a note 100a.
107a Emmons v. Alvord, 177 Mass. 466, 59 N. E. 126 (1901).
Commonwealth v. Hunton, 168 Mass. 130, 46 N. E. 404 (1897).
lo
109 Wells v. Putnam, 169 Mass. 226,47 N. E. 1005 (1897).
11o Commonwealth v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 49 N. E. 91 (1898).
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sible in such cases, but did not get the defendants any further
than they were when the verdict of guilty was entered in the
trial court."' But the court left political actions, done within
the framework of the statute and the charter, to the city
whether it involved disciplining firemen "' or counting votes
or determining the validity of ballots."'
The cases which arose out of the operation of the railroads
and the private and public interference with water rights
gave Holmes an opportunity to explain and develop the law
of those rights which arise from the duty a member of society
owes to others and which the law calls torts or wrongs. These
cases also opened the door to the explaining and definition of
the rights which a land owner enjoys. The society was on an
agricultural and industrial basis. Land and rights in it were
important to the one and the water of the many rivers was
important to the other as a source of power. This does not
state the entire activity of the community. The rights in land
brought before the court the seashore and the "flats" along
the estuaries of the sea." 4 The commercial activity extended
afar. A London firm sued for the price of machinery delivered
in Boston;". 5 the liability of a forwarding express from Paris
must be settled; 6 and who should bear the water damage to
sets of Balzac imported from Paris; "' also the effect of a
draft drawn on a bank in Turkey;". 8 the right of Massachusetts firms to recover the price of liquor sold in Boston with
a knowledge it was to be shipped into dry Maine for illegal
sales there;".9 marine policies on ships lost or damaged at sea
Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 181 Mass. 184, 63 N. E. 421 (1902).
Norton v. Brookline, 181 Mass. 360, 65 N. E. 794 (1902).
113 O'Connell v. Matthews, 177 Mass. 518, 59 N. E. 195 (1901).
114 Stone v. The Commonwealth, 181 Mass. 438, 67 N. E. 356 (1902).
115 Whitehead & Atherton Machine Co. v. Ryder, 139 Mass. 366, 31 N. E. 736
(1885).
116 Case v. Baldwin, 136 Mass. 90 (1883).
117 Hardy v. American Express, 182 Mass. 328, 65 N. E. 375 (1902).
118 Aslanian v. Dostumian, 174 Mass. 328, 54 N. E. 845 (1899). Origin of law
merchant discussed and not presumed to prevail in Turkey in absence of proof.
119 Graves v. Johnson, 156 Mass. 211, 30 N. E. 818 (1892).
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were frequently litigated;1 2 0 firms in New York, where women might contract separately, sued men in Massachusetts on
business contracts their wives made in New York;... Nova
Scotia parents sued local liquor dealers for selling liquor to
their son while intoxicated and whereby he was injured; 2 2
Rhode Island firms claimed damages for the diversion of
water from rivers which flow through both states; 2 3 an Irish
emigrant boy is killed in industrial work and his dependent
mother in Ireland brings an action under the statute and gets
a verdict. It is appealed on the ground the mother has no
rights under the statute being a foreigner. Holmes can see
no distinction under this particular statute between a mother
in Ireland and one in Rhode Island; a large body of foreign
labor is employed in the state; if the deceased had been
maimed just short of being killed he could have sued and got
his damages;
"We cannot think that workmen were intended to be less protected

if their mothers happen to live abroad or less protected against a sudden
than against lingering death; an exception of that kind would not be
left by the Legislature to be silently read into the act." 124

(To be continued)
Perlie P. Fallon.
New York City.
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